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In addition to his voluminous fictional output, David Foster Wallace wrote a large quantity
of writing that can be deemed non-fiction. The subject matter of this material is diverse and
ranges from rap music and race, through the philosophy of mathematics, US electoral politics,
and animal welfare in the gastronomic space, up to prescriptivist grammar. It is partly Wallace’s
reputation in the non-fictional space – perhaps as a “philosopher-novelist” of sorts – that has led
to more general claims for his “genius” and literary canonization1 For indeed, the symbiosis of
the essay form with the career of the contemporary novelist is undeniable.2 
Before  considering  Wallace’s non-fictional  writing,  it  is  first  worth  querying  the  strict
division  between  “fiction” and  “fact” that  structures  this  binary.  For,  in  essays  such  as  “A
Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do Again,” Wallace introduces humorous set pieces that add to
the comic timbre of the work in general, but that seem unlikely, actually, to have occurred. As an
example, there is the instance where Wallace claims in this essay that he believes he is surveilled
while aboard the cruise ship, thus allowing the cabin crew to conduct their cleaning activities
only when he is out of his cabin for more than thirty minutes. And certainly this episode provides
Wallace with some humorous material:
So now for a while I theorize that somehow a special crewman is assigned to each
passenger  and  follows  that  passenger  at  all  times,  using  extremely  sophisticated
techniques of personal surveillance and reporting the passenger’s movements and
activities and projected time of cabin-return back to Steward HQ or something, and
1  See, for more on this, Severs, Balancing Books, 3.
2  See, for just one example,Childs and Gigante, The Cambridge History of the British Essay.
so for about a day I try taking extreme evasive actions—whirling suddenly to check
behind me, popping around corners, darting in and out of Gift Shops via different
doors, etc.—never one sign of anybody engaged in surveillance.3
But a fundamental question remains: is this passage non-fiction? Do readers really believe that
Wallace took these actions? I would argue not. Instead, portions of Wallace’s journalistic and
essayistic outputs should be thought of as  “creative non-fiction.”  That is, in keeping with the
near-term literary-historical field in which he was working – postmodernism – Wallace’s non-
fiction is not straightforwardly non, but instead blurs the creative-critical boundary. 
I  further  contend  here  that  Wallace’s non-fiction  writing,  using  many  of  the  same
metafictional techniques as in his fiction, needs to be understood in relation to poststructuralist
philosophies of text that ask  what we mean by fiction vs non-fiction. Does non-fiction really
mean “writing that refers to an extra-textual reality”?
Since  the  high  point  of  poststructuralist  theory  in  the  1970s,  it  has  been  a  literary-
philosophical commonplace to state that there is no absolute difference between literary and non-
literary writing. That is, there is nothing a work of fiction or non-fiction can do within its own
language to persuade a reader absolutely of its own factuality or fictionality. John Searle and
Jacques Derrida have both claimed this  at  various points. For Searle,  “The utterance acts  of
fiction are indistinguishable from the utterance acts of serious discourse,” while for Derrida, “No
exposition,  no discursive  form is  intrinsically  or  essentially  literary before  or  outside of  the
function it is assigned.”4 The only problem for such a view is that Andrew Piper shows that
machine classification  can distinguish between fact and fiction with over 95% accuracy using
just a 1,250-word stretch of text.5 For the sake of clarity, this computational approach is not
checking  whether  a  text  is  true.  It  verifies  only  the  work’s “intended  truth  claims” within
language.6 
3 Wallace, SFT, 256-353.
4  Searle, “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse,” 68; Blanchot and Derrida, The Instant of My Death, 28.
5  Piper, Enumerations: Data and Literary Study.
6  Piper, 98. Portions of this paragraph are drawn from Eve, “Review of Andrew Piper”
While future work may wish computationally to examine the linguistic traits of Wallace’s
fiction  against  his  non-fiction,  the  remainder  of  this  chapter  is  devoted  to  a  representative
descriptive sampling of Wallace’s non-fiction across his career, mostly drawn from  Signifying
Rappers (1990); A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do Again (1997); Everything and More: A
Compact History of Infinity (2003);  Consider the Lobster (2005);  TIW (2009);  Fate, Time and
Language:  An Essay on Free Will (2010);  and  Both  Flesh  and Not (2012).  For  the sake of
expediency, rather than because it is the only classificatory system or because these works can
neatly  be  so  carved,  I  divide  the  rest  of  this  chapter  into  the  headings  of  “Philosophy,”
“Experiential Argument” and “Politics.” It is worth admitting, up front, that this schema perhaps
accords less attention to one area of Wallace’s practice than it might. For Wallace also wrote
works of literary criticism. Some of these pieces,  such as his 1997 review of John Updike’s
Toward the End of Time, have become influential in their own right, particularly in this instance
for introducing the phrase “the Great Male Narcissists” to refer to Norman Mailer, Updike and
Philip Roth.7 Such work can, also, however, often fall under the rubric of  “politics,” rooted as
they usually are within sociological paradigms. Hence, despite its tendency to oversimplify, I
stick to the above mapping for this chapter’s cartography. 
Finally, for this introduction, it would be remiss not to note that there are, on occasion,
differences  between the  versions  of  Wallace’s non-fiction  essays  that  were  published  in  the
original  serial  venues  (journals,  magazines  and  so  forth)  and  the  editions  that  appear  in
subsequent  anthologies.8 Thus,  it  is  always  worth  comparing  sources  when  working  with
Wallace’s non-fiction writing.
Philosophy
It is no secret that his father was a philosophy professor and that Wallace’s undergraduate degree
was  a  joint  major  in  English  and  philosophy.  Indeed,  it  is  often  reported  that  it  was  the
philosophical element of Wallace’s intellectual purview that dominated, with one commentator
remarking that he  “knew him as a philosopher with a fiction hobby.”9 This comes across in
7 Wallace, “John Updike, Champion Literary Phallocrat”
8 See, for instance “Tense Present” in Harper’s Magazine vs “Authority and American Usage,” in Consider the Lobster.
9 Wallace, Fate, Time, and Language, 3.
Wallace’s non-fiction writing, which has a strong philosophical strand, embracing the histories of
mathematics, logic and other areas, and most strongly embodied in  Everything and More  and
Fate, Time and Language. There have also, to date, been at least two volumes solely dedicated to
exploring Wallace’s philosophical output.10 It could be said, in fact, that much of Wallace’s non-
fiction writing is philosophical in its content. 
It  is  worth  noting  upfront,  also,  that  Wallace’s philosophical  writings  bend
problematically towards appropriation for self-help purposes.11 In particular, the publication of
his  almost-schmaltzy  Kenyon  commencement  address  as  TIW has  tended,  in  the  popular
imagination, to overshadow Wallace’s actual philosophical work. It is debatable whether Wallace
would  even  have  classified  this  text  as  “philosophy,” filled,  as  it  is,  with  “didactic  little
stor[ies].”12
Wallace’s only formal contribution to philosophical literature is the published version of
his undergraduate philosophy honors thesis, Fate, Time and Language. This work is a response
to  a  1962  essay  in  The  Philosophical  Review  by  Richard  Taylor  called  “Fatalism.”13 In
“Fatalism,” Taylor presents a novel argument for fatalistic thinking – that is, the notion that all
actions are predetermined and cannot be modified. Taylor does this by presenting six widely
accepted  propositions  from  contemporary  philosophy  and  showing  them  to  be  logically
incompatible with the idea of free will. The basic twist that Taylor achieves is to show that, while
we accept that our actions in the present cannot influence the past (and, indeed, are constrained
or determined by them), the same can be said of future events. That is, that a gun barrel is cool in
the future,  for Taylor,  can be shown to determine the fact  that the gun was not fired in the
present. 
Taylor’s article prompted grave disquiet, as evidenced by the number of direct responses,
which are collected in  Fate, Time and Language. Yet, while there was consensus that Taylor’s
conclusions  were  undesirable  –  that  either  the  universe  is  fatalistic  or  that  there  are  major
problems  with  some  of  the  core  propositions  of  contemporary  philosophy  –  there  was  no
10 Bolger and Korb (eds), Gesturing toward Reality ; Cahn and Eckert (eds), Freedom and the Self
11 D.T. Max, “Why David Foster Wallace Should Not Be Worshipped as a Secular Saint.”
12 Wallace, TIW.
13  Taylor, “Fatalism”
agreement  among respondents  as  to  precisely  what  was wrong with Taylor’s reasoning.  For
Wallace, as well as for Steven Cahn who edited the Wallace volume, one of the core problems
with the respondents was that many of them argued that Taylor’s piece could not be correct
because it ended up showing that fatalism was indeed how the universe works.
Wallace’s award-winning thesis and posthumous book argued that the problem in Taylor’s
logic required a new formal language that could express what he calls the intensional-physical-
modality system. Reading this system is not for the faint-hearted (the first rule of the system is:
“[[tnp]]w = 1 iff [[p]] w,t/n = 1”). The basic gist of Wallace’s argument is easier to grasp, though,
and  concerns  situated  truths  with  respect  to  physical  embodiment  (“situational  physical
modality”). It asks questions of “impossibility” with respect to the placement of an individual at
any particular time; what does it mean to say that one can do something – or has the possibility
to do something – when that person is situated at a particular geo-temporal coordinate? 
Others have explored more thoroughly the extent to which Wallace’s contribution marks
a  serious  philosophical  intervention,  with  Columbia  University  Press  insisting  that  the  book
underwent thorough peer review, while the paratexts in the edited edition tactfully sidestep an
appraisal of the correctness of his argument. Wallace’s other philosophical contribution, though,
was through his work on the philosophy of mathematics.
In  Everything and More: A Compact History of Infinity, Wallace turns his attention to
Cantorian mathematical philosophies. This is not a work of original philosophy or history, but
rather a piece of “pop technical writing” that explores some of the ways in which mathematical
paradoxes can be resolved within specific paradigms of understanding “infinity.” 
It is also a work that has attracted some scathing denunciations from mathematicians. As
Amir D. Aczel put it, “this book is very disappointing. I found mathematical misinterpretations
[…,] many mathematical statements that are patently wrong [… and] Wallace is not the right
expositor  of  these  ideas.”14 Michael  Harris,  another  professor  of  mathematics,  wrote  that
Wallace’s book was “laced through and through with blunders of every magnitude.”15 Elsewhere,
14 Aczel, “When Good Novelists Do Bad Science.”
15 Harris, “A Sometimes Funny Book Supposedly about Infinity”
a further well-qualified commentator called  Everything and More  “a train wreck of a book, a
disaster.”16 The  Wallace  fansite,  The  Howling  Fantods,  even  contains  a  mathematical  errata
document that runs to three A4 pages in length of corrections to Wallace’s math.17 
Readers of this work should, therefore, be careful in approaching Wallace’s history of
infinity as a work of mathematics. Instead, as Roberto Natalini has shown, this work perhaps
better serves as a key to understanding certain formal decisions made in the crafting of Wallace’s
novels, including his indebtedness to other math-centric works, such as Don DeLillo’s Ratner’s
Star  (1976).18 Yet the question remains: if the book is so bad as a work of mathematics, what
does this say for our use of such explication as a backdrop against which to situate Wallace’s
fiction?  
Wallace  was,  to  some extent,  skeptical  of  such uses  of  his  philosophical  writings  to
underscore his fictional work. In an oft-quoted 2006 interview, he disarmingly said that “If some
people read my fiction and see it as fundamentally about philosophical ideas, what it probably
means is that these are pieces where the characters are not as alive and interesting as I meant
them to be.”19 Yet the very idea that Wallace might be a “therapeutic” writer is indebted to his
association  with  Wittgensteinian  philosophy  and  the  idea  that  “doing  philosophy” might  or
should itself be a therapeutic activity.20 It is, therefore, worth noting that Wallace’s philosophical
writing does overlap with his fiction. For instance, the “Eschaton” game in Infinite Jest (1996)
relies on various philosophies of mathematics and representational/critical  reality.21 Likewise,
The Broom of the System has an explicitly Wittgensteinian theme.
In all, though, it is clear that Wallace’s formal philosophical and mathematical texts are,
in themselves, relatively slight and not well regarded by those outside of his fictional fanbase,
bucking the critical trend that Thompson identified in a previous chapter of following Wallace’s
implicit  (and  explicit)  directions  for  interpretation  (and  not  even  well  regarded  by
16 Rucker, “Infinite Confusion”p.313 
17 Ragde, “Mathematical Errata” [presumably URL is in bibliography?]
18 Natalini, “David Foster Wallace and the Mathematics of Infinity.”
19 Karmodi, “A Frightening Time in America”
20 See Baskin, Ordinary Unhappiness
21 Wallace, IJ, 321-41. For more on this, see Eve, “Equivocationary Horseshit”
mathematicians who enjoy his fiction). Where his non-fiction writing becomes stronger, though,
is in his experiential creative non-fiction.
Experiential Argument
Wallace’s non-fiction  really  comes  into  its  own  when  he  writes  in  magazines  about  his
experiences, be they aboard cruise ships (“A Supposedly Fun Thing”), watching Roger Federer
play tennis (“Roger Federer as Religious Experience”), and visiting lobster festivals (“Consider
the Lobster”). These pieces allow for his expansive prose style to work its  humor without the
threat of  inaccuracy within the contents that plagues his technical works on philosophy and
mathematics. 
That said, as noted above, there are inaccuracies in these works that cast some doubt on
the definition of “non-fiction.” Consider Wallace’s description of a Federer shot:
Federer’s  still  near  the  corner  but  running  toward  the  centerline,  and  the  ball’s
heading to a point behind him now, where he just was, and there’s no time to turn his
body around,  and Agassi’s  following the shot  in  to  the net  at  an angle from the
backhand side...and what Federer now does is somehow instantly reverse thrust and
sort of skip backward three or four steps, impossibly fast, to hit a forehand out of his
backhand corner,  all  his  weight  moving backward,  and the forehand is  a  topspin
screamer down the line past Agassi at net, who lunges for it but the ball’s past him,
and  it  flies  straight  down the  sideline  and  lands  exactly  in  the  deuce  corner  of
Agassi’s side, a winner — Federer’s still dancing backward as it lands. And there’s
that familiar  little second of shocked silence from the New York crowd before it
erupts,  and  John  McEnroe  with  his  color  man’s  headset  on  TV says  (mostly  to
himself, it sounds like), “How do you hit a winner from that position?”22
Yet, in the age of YouTube, a quick verification search shows that McEnroe’s comment applies to
a  shot  that  is  barely  anything  like  the  one  described  by  Wallace.  As  with  many  religious
22 Wallace, “Federer as Religious Experience”
experiences, seeing Federer play tennis was clearly deeply personal for Wallace and difficult to
correlate  with  any  extra-textual,  shared  reality.  Wallace’s non-fiction  certainly  comes  with
fictional embellishments.
More positively, though, perhaps what works best with Wallace’s experiential essays is
that they are also all driven by an argumentative thrust. In the case of Federer, Wallace states that
“The specific thesis here is that if you’ve never seen the young man play live, and then do, in
person, on the sacred grass of Wimbledon, through the literally withering heat and then wind and
rain of the ’06 fortnight, then you are apt to have what one of the tournament’s press bus drivers
describes  as  a  ‘bloody  near-religious  experience.’”23 Elsewhere,  the  arguments  that  drive
Wallace’s non-fiction are arguably more extreme. When it comes to the Maine Lobster Festival,
for example, Wallace argues that we should consider the sentience of the animal that is boiled
alive, and even takes this so far as to compare the festival with the Holocaust.
Time  and  again,  Wallace  crafts  his  essayistic  experiential  pieces  into  argumentative
propositions that deliberately contrast two extreme poles for humorous effect. So while Wallace
claims, in  “A Supposedly Fun Thing,” that he has been hired to write “a directionless essayish
thing,” with a “paucity of direction or angle,” he repeatedly distrusts such commissions. “They
keep saying—on the phone, Ship-to-Shore, very patiently—not to fret about it,” he writes. Yet
Wallace also says that “They are sort of disingenuous, I believe, these magazine people. They say
all they want is a sort of really big experiential postcard—go, plow the Caribbean in style, come
back, say what you’ve seen.”  Wallace instead turns his experiential postcard into an argument
about how the “pampered” living style, marketed as featuring on-board a seven-night cruise, is
transformed  into  a  “kind  of  death-and-dread-transcendence.”24 It  is,  of  course,  the  bathetic
differences  between  these  poles  –  a  seven-night  luxury  cruise  and  “death-and-dread-
transcendence”; a lobster festival and the Holocaust; Roger Federer and religious experience –
that  drive  Wallace’s creative  non-fiction.  Wallace  gives  us  arguments,  but  they  are  often
deliberately absurd. 
23  Ibid
24  Wallace, “A Supposedly Fun Thing”
Wallace’s extremity is not just achieved through wild juxtaposition of the everyday and
the outlandish; his subject matter is often, itself, also unusual. Consider, for instance, Wallace’s
essay “Big Red Son,” the subject of which is the pornographic film industry and its effect upon
contemporary culture. 
This subject allows Wallace, once more, to create humor in his non-fiction writing. After
all, when simply handed character/stage names such as “Dick Filth,” there is barely any need for
Wallace to return to the Pynchonian naming style that he deployed in his first novel, The Broom
of the System (1987). It’s as though the gags come pre-packaged. 
However, there is also a danger circling around this area. While Wallace takes care to
highlight feminist perspectives on pornography and to draw attention to the toxic masculinity
that inheres in such culture, as with mathematics, one has to ask whether he is always the right
person to  do so.25 After  all,  as  Edward Jackson has  highlighted  in  the  wake of  D.T.  Max’s
biography, and as later essays in this volume demonstrate, Wallace is intensely problematic with
respect to gender and sexuality.26
All of which is to say that Wallace’s experiential argumentative essays should always be
viewed with a critical  eye on his perspectivized position.  Just  as,  in his  philosophical work,
Wallace  argued  for  the  importance  of  embodied  positional  takes,  rather  than  transcendental
subjects, I contend that reading Wallace’s “non”-fiction requires us to situate his work in relation
to the man, and to pay attention to what we know about his life. For the experiential angle that
Wallace brings punctures any bubble of the intentional fallacy; the life and the writing cannot sit
wholly apart from one another. Which brings us, finally, to politics in Wallace’s writing.
Politics
Although,  as  Marshall  Boswell  puts  it,  “Wallace  is  not  generally  thought  of  as  a  political
novelist,” a  complex personal  politics are  evident  in his  essayistic  non-fiction.27 Perhaps the
25 Wallace, “Big Red Son,” 18-19.
26 Jackson, David Foster Wallace’s Toxic Sexuality; Max, Every Love Story
27 Boswell, “Trickle-Down Citizenship” 211.
clearest  example  of  this  is  in  Wallace’s profile  of  Senator  John McCain,  collected  as  “Up,
Simba” in Consider the Lobster. A non-partisan piece that, in the collected version, comes with a
self-situating statement that notes that, on this occasion, Wallace voted for the Democrat Bill
Bradley, Wallace’s article purports to be neither pro- nor anti- McCain.28 While Boswell notes the
importance of this essay for the discussion of civics in The Pale King, I would personally also
draw attention to the humor that Wallace again brings to the piece, for example that the press
buses are known as “Bullshit 1” and “Bullshit 2.”29
Perhaps more importantly, though, I would like to highlight that politics in Wallace’s non-
fiction are to be found in the least likely of places (although this  is perhaps to be expected.
Defining “politics” is a notoriously difficult task as it encompasses all kinds of interpersonal
interactions, as evidenced in the above note on Wallace’s literary criticism).30 One of Wallace’s
most political,  but also, surprisingly,  most readable and ranging essays is his “Authority and
American Usage,” a review of a dictionary.31 
Specifically, Wallace’s review of Bryan A. Garner’s A Dictionary of Modern American
Usage is even subtitled “or, ‘Politics and the English Language’ is redundant.” This work, which
actually unites all the strands that I have here covered, roves from explications of Wittgenstein’s
private language argument to giving a “thesis statement” – the argumentative trope for which I
advocated above.32
Wallace’s essay also dedicates a substantial portion of its rhetoric to the different political
stances that dictionaries can hold. Namely, it asserts/ shows/ argues? that those who advocate for
grammatical  dictionaries  can  be  either  prescriptivist  or  descriptivist,  with  the  former  camp
specifying how language should be used, while the latter describe how language is used. This, in
itself, represents different polarities of political opinion in the United States. 
28 Wallace, “Up, Simba,” 157.
29 Ibid,171.
30 See, for a good example, Markovits, The Politics of Sincerity.
31 Wallace, “Authority and American Usage.”
32 Ibid, 72.
Wallace goes further than this, though. In a highly controversial move, he extends the
analogy between prescriptivism and descriptivism to discuss women’s reproductive rights in the
context  of  US democratic  tolerance  and the  Roe vs.  Wade  ruling.33 Wallace  is  cautious  and
equivocationary here, though. Instead of taking any kind of principled stance, he instead argues
that it is necessary to be both “Pro-Life and Pro-Choice,” in a kind of rejection of binary logic.
Wallace uses a type of rational logic to argue for the respect for life in the case of doubt as to
whether a fetus should be deemed a living human, while also arguing that he cannot infringe
upon the reproductive and bodily autonomy of a pregnant  woman. The answer that Wallace
comes to is, however, mealy mouthed and allows him to worm out of the situation without ever
answering the ethical call: one has to pick one’s side on the basis of an individual moral decision
that involves a hard choice, not to evade the choice by claiming that we can take both options. 
And it  is  on this  note that I  will  close this  chapter.  Wallace’s  non-fiction writings –
however we choose to define them – provide a rich ground for scholars and fans of his fiction, or
as works standing alone. I have sought here to challenge notions that these writings are discrete
because they are purely factual,  and that  they can be separated  from Wallace’s  fiction by a
distinction between truth and fabrication. I have also suggested that some artificial groupings –
philosophy,  experiential  argument  and politics  –  can  provide  frames  that  help  us  categorize
Wallace’s non-fiction writings, to some extent.  In all,  though, Wallace’s non-fiction writings
present sources that are not just informative for and generative of his fiction, but that work in
symbiosis with those other writings. As such, they deserve and reward close attention in their
own right, not necessarily as non-fictions, but more as “non”-fiction.
33 Wallace, “Authority and American Usage,” 82.
